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WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
PERCEPTIONS OF ORDINARY PEOPLE AND JUDGES 
JILL D. WEINBERG* AND LAURA BETH NIELSEN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the movie “Horrible Bosses,” Jennifer Aniston plays a dentist, Dr. Julia 
Harris, who harasses her dental assistant, Dale, played by Charlie Day. She 
sprays water on his crotch, grabs his penis, accosts him while wearing nothing 
but a lab coat and underwear, and threatens to tell his fiancé that they had 
sexual relations unless he actually has sex with her. The other protagonists in 
the film mock Dale, saying her sexual advances are not bad, and that he should 
be thrilled his attractive boss shows interest in him. Movie-goers find these 
scenes humorous: they laugh at Dale’s high-pitched voice, his awkwardness 
when he is harassed, and his demands for a “rape-free environment.” 
The movie’s humor relies on shared social knowledge that there are 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” victims of workplace harassment. Public 
perceptions of sexual harassment map onto cultural scripts of who can be a 
legitimate victim. Put another way, if the roles were reversed – a male superior 
harassing a female subordinate – our interpretation of the events featured in the 
film would change. A male boss acting in that manner would be viewed as 
exerting his power to coerce his employee to have sex with him, and the 
employee’s friends would be encouraging her to find an attorney or a new job, 
at the very least. The scenes would no longer be humorous, and any attempt to 
make comedic humor of a male harassing a female would be deemed 
inappropriate, insensitive, and deplorable. 
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This example from “Horrible Bosses” also raises interesting questions 
about the nature of laws concerning sexual harassment. If our perceptions 
about a movie would change if we change the gender of the boss-perpetrator 
and the employee-victim, does this translate in the way individuals determine 
whether a workplace dispute constitutes illegal sexual harassment or offensive, 
yet non-actionable conduct? While sexual harassment laws are gender-neutral, 
that is, the perpetrator can be a female harassing a male or a male harassing 
another male, are people convinced that this is possible? And, are there other 
facts that make a sexual harassment claim more or less credible? 
This Article is motivated by a series of empirical and normative questions. 
First, do judges and ordinary people perceive sexual harassment differently? 
Second, does a person’s background shape their perceptions about the absence 
or presence of sexual harassment? Employment discrimination claims are 
emotionally charged for the individuals involved, and allegations of sexual 
harassment are no different. Based on prior research, we have found that a 
person’s social location and identity predicts whether an individual views a 
workplace dispute as illegal.1 
We examine these questions empirically, using experimental research 
methods. Specifically, we developed a survey that contains vignettes of 
hypothetical workplace disputes that varies the characteristics of the alleged 
victim and perpetrator, the conduct involved, and the workplace policy on 
sexual harassment. Our study also collected demographic information of the 
judges and ordinary people, so we could identify whether the two groups 
define sexual harassment differently. 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part II highlights the legal, 
sociological, and psychological literatures that make claims about how 
ordinary people understand and define sexual harassment. Part III describes 
our research methodology and data used to address our two research questions. 
We used a factorial survey to examine the legal and extra-legal factors that 
predict when ordinary people and trial judges identify a workplace dispute as 
illegal discrimination. There have been few studies that investigate judicial 
patterns using this technique,2 and even fewer studies that compare ordinary 
people and judges.3 Part IV presents the results of our study. Our data show 
variation across the ordinary people and judge populations, specifically 
 
 1. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, 
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., John Hagan, Gabrielle Ferrales & Guillermina Jasso, How Law Rules: Torture, 
Terror, and the Normative Judgments of Iraqi Judges, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 605 (2008); Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey R. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 3. Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of 
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & THE 
L. 113 (1994). 
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ordinary people tend to have a broader definition on what constitutes sexual 
harassment than judges. We conclude by considering whether the law should 
take a broader conception of sexual harassment, given the differences across 
the ordinary people and judge populations. 
II.  THEORIES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Sexual harassment is a form of illegal workplace sex discrimination, 
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 Accordingly, sexual 
harassment is defined as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute 
sexual harassment . . . [that] explicitly or implicitly affects an individual's 
employment.”5 There are two legal theories of sexual harassment. The first is 
“quid pro quo” whereby a sexual advance or threat affects the employee-
victim’s terms of employment – for example sex in exchange for a promotion.6 
The second theory, “hostile work environment,” refers to a workplace with 
severe and pervasive conduct that it interferes with an employee’s ability to 
perform his or her job.7 
While the formal law provides the legal architecture of what constitutes 
sexual harassment, real life is more complex and contextual. A particular 
workplace environment does not constitute sexual harassment, but a judge or 
jury may inclined to view it as evidence of harassment. In what follows are 
possible explanations on why sexual harassment occurs and how these factors 
may explain why someone would view a situation as unacceptable versus 
illegal. Based on a review of sociological, psychological, and legal literatures, 
we hypothesize that there are five significant explanations of sexual 
harassment: workplace hierarchy, gender hierarchy, organizational responses 
to harassment, conduct, and the lived experience. These explanations serve as 
our hypotheses underlying our empirical study. 
A. Workplace Hierarchy 
Sociologists suggest that sexual harassment is the result of an exploitative 
unequal power relationship within the workplace.8 Broadly, sociologists 
suggest that the structure of work environments, combined with the 
composition within work settings creates the conditions for sexual harassment 
to occur. Structural aspects of the workplace promote inequities between 
 
 4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). 
 5. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). 
 6. Id.; 62 Am. Jur. Trials 235, Westlaw (originally published in 1997, database updated 
Dec. 2016). 
 7. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986). 
 8. See Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt & Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at 
Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 37–40 (1982). 
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individuals, most notably by way of a hierarchical leadership configuration. At 
the same time, occupational sex segregation remains salient – that is, some 
industries and occupations remain disproportionately dominated by either men 
or women or men occupy positions of authority within a workplace more than 
women.9 The tiered nature of organizations, together with sex segregation, 
creates the conditions for sexual harassment at work. 
This theory predicts that evaluators are more likely to identify a scenario as 
sexual harassment if it involves a superior with power and authority over a 
subordinate employee. In this case, the gender of the superior and subordinate 
would be irrelevant (or at least less relevant than hierarchy), and individuals 
would be less inclined to consider conduct between coworkers or a 
subordinate-aggressor to be illegal harassment.  
B. Gender Hierarchy in Society 
Some feminist theorists argue that harassment is a product of patriarchal 
society, whereby victimization of women affirms they remain inferior to 
men.10 Rooted in sociocultural explanations, these theories suggest that sexual 
harassment is a product of broader legitimized power and status differences 
between men and women exist everywhere in society and therefore are present 
in the workplace. In other words, sexual harassment is understood as an 
outgrowth of power and dominance over women both at work and in society at 
large. 
Proponents of this explanation emphasize gender as a key predictor of who 
is at risk of harassment. The gender of the victim would have the most impact 
for a trier of fact. Even though the law explicitly states males can be victims of 
sexual harassment,11 men would be less likely to be viewed victims (as the 
Horrible Bosses example illustrates). 
C. The Organizational Meaning of Harassment 
A third perspective posits that the presence of internal structures (e.g., 
human resources departments) and formalized policies and procedures 
outlining unacceptable workplace conduct influence perceptions of legal 
compliance. Organizational sociology research argues that irrespective of their 
effectiveness, judges view explicit anti-harassment policies as indicia of 
 
 9. See, e.g., Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 241, 
241–42 (1993). 
 10. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
215–19 (1989); see also Kathleen M. Rospenda, Judith A. Richman & Stephanie J. Nawyn, 
Doing Power: The Confluence of Gender, Race, and Class in Contrapower Sexual Harassment, 
12 GENDER & SOC’Y 40 (1998) (conceptualizing sexual harassment as a sociocultural 
phenomenon and not necessarily a top-down hierarchical phenomenon). 
 11. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998). 
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compliance with anti-discrimination law.12 Furthermore, according to 
employment discrimination law, any sexual harassment policy is sufficient 
compliance. 
This theory posits that judges and ordinary people will view the presence 
or the absence of an anti-harassment policy differently. Judges, as legally 
trained professionals, should be more deferential to internal grievance 
procedures, knowing they can offset employer liability of sexual harassment, 
specifically, and employment discrimination, more broadly. We also predict 
that ordinary people unfamiliar with the law would be uninfluenced by anti-
harassment policies in a workplace, and more influenced by other factors such 
as the conduct or the fact the employee left the job after feeling victimized. 
D. The Conduct 
The fourth theory focuses on the conduct involved. Conduct that is more 
graphically sexual in nature (e.g., a touching) would be viewed differently 
from less sexual gesture such as complimenting someone’s outfit. For this 
theory, we believe judges and ordinary people view the perpetrator’s conduct 
differently. We predict judges will be less likely affected by the conduct at 
issue, whereas ordinary people will be more willing to identify conduct as 
unacceptable, even if it does not constitute a hostile work environment. 
E. The Lived Experience of Harassment 
The final hypothesis draws from extensive psychology literature which 
shows that an individual’s personal background and identity characteristics 
may influence how they perceive social situations. Specifically, research on 
empathy suggests individuals who are able to identify with victims have a 
greater willingness to help that individual. Put another way, individuals are 
more or less likely to perceive the presence of discrimination based on their 
identification with a stigmatized social group, whereby the more an individual 
identifies with a devalued social group, the more likely he or she will view a 
situation as discrimination.13 
In the study featured in this article, we contend an individual’s background 
will shape how they respond to questions about the presence or absence of 
sexual harassment. Based on research on empathy, we predict both judges and 
 
 12. The courts have, in essence, encouraged organizations to create discrimination policies 
and procedures by suggesting that they serve as a defense from liability or monetary damages. 
See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). For an extensive discussion on the ways organizational policies 
influence judicial decision making, see LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, 
CORPORATIONS AND SYMBOLIC RIGHTS (2016). 
 13. For an in-depth discussion of psychology research on empathy and legal decision 
making, see Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, supra note 3. 
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ordinary people rely upon personal experience when evaluating the workplace 
scenarios presented to them. Specifically, we believe white women and people 
of color – individuals who are traditionally the most effected by workplace 
discrimination and harassment – will identify the workplace vignettes as 
harassment, whereas white men will not. 
III.  DATA AND METHODS 
A. Judge and Ordinary People Populations 
To examine perceptions of sexual harassment, we used a factorial survey 
featuring descriptions of workplace disputes. Participants of our ordinary 
people sample came from a nationally representative sample of 2,087 people 
drawn by Knowledge Networks (KN), an online research and analysis firm that 
maintains a panel of 48,725 U.S. households for its surveys.14 From our initial 
sample, we removed individuals who completed the survey in less than six 
minutes, and who answered fewer than six manipulation check questions 
correctly, yielding a final sample of 1,883 respondents. A demographic 
breakdown of ordinary people is featured in Table 1. 
  
 
 14. KN estimates that its sampling methods provide 97% coverage, meaning that 97% of the 
intended population falls within its recruitment methods. For a more detailed discussion of the 
sampling strategy of the ordinary people population, see generally Jill D. Weinberg, Jeremy 
Freese & David McElhattan, Comparing Data Characteristics and Results of an Online Factorial 
Survey Between a Population-Based and a Crowdsource-Recruited Sample, 1 SOC. SCI. 292 
(2014). 
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N = 1883 
Table 1 presents the demographic information about the ordinary people in our 
sample. The ordinary people in this sample include male (50.35%), white 
(78.97%), and an average age in their 50s (age range 18-93). Thirty-nine point 
four six percent (39.46%) of respondents obtained a bachelor’s degree or 
higher. In terms of political ideology, which we operationalize as a three 
category variable – conservative, moderate, and liberal – 40.8% identified as 
liberal. 
Because judges have strict protocols about email – most notably, email 
addresses are often not publicly available – we sent paper surveys to judges 
with a self-addressed envelope. We generated a sample of federal and state 
court judges to send surveys. We sent surveys to all federal district court 
judges because of the limited population (N=942) and to a random sample15 of 
state trial court judges (N=600). Information about the judges was retrieved 
 
 15. We selected judges from selected states to capture regional variation. These states 
included the similar cities featured in large-scale research on employment discrimination. See, 
e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective 
Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 175, 181 (2010); John Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing 
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 983, 985 (1991). 
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from The American Bench, a judicial directory that lists the names and 
addresses of both Federal and state court judges.16 In total, we received over 
200 surveys.17 Similar to the ordinary people population, we removed 
respondents who incorrectly answered less than 6 manipulation check 
questions. In this case, we removed one judge respondent. A demographic 
breakdown of judges is featured in Table 2 below. 

































N = 199 
Table 2 shows the composition of our judge sample on the basis of gender, 
race, age, and political party identification. Given that we did not want to 
devise a survey that revealed the identity of a judge, we had to keep the 
categories broad (e.g., age by decade) and exclude regional information. 
Judges in this sample were predominantly male (78.5%), white (82.5%), and in 
their 60s (47.97%). These figures, however, are representative of the federal 
judiciary at the trial level.18 
 
 16. See THE AMERICAN BENCH (Forster-Long, LLC, ed. 2016). 
 17. While our response rate is low (11% federal; 18.5% state, respectively), sampling from a 
national pool tends to have a lower response rate because judges are less willing to complete 
surveys sent in the mail. 
 18. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF JUDGES, http://www.fjc. 
gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
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B. Research Methodology: The Factorial Survey 
Factorial surveys involve subjects reading and respond to vignettes, or 
short statements describing a scenario of interest – what law professors and 
students colloquially refer to as “hypos” or “hypotheticals.” This research 
design allows us to examine the isolate specific variables in shaping judgments 
of discrimination and perceptions of appropriate responses to these 
situations.19 In this case, workplace disputes involving potential sexual 
harassment contain a range of factors that may determine whether the target’s 
grievance is legitimate or perceived as legally actionable. By randomly 
assigning different characteristics within the framework of the same vignette, 
factorial design allows the researcher to identify the effect of worker and 
workplace characteristics as influencing evaluators’ determination of whether a 
dispute rises to the level of “illegal discrimination.” 
Each vignette is composed of a set of factors (independent variables), each 
of which contains several possible randomly assigned levels (variable values). 
In this study, respondents received three sexual harassment vignettes. Each 
vignette features a workplace dispute in which a worker experiences some 
form of workplace harassment that results in him or her quitting. The vignettes 
use different company descriptions.20 
Every vignette features 1 randomly assigned level from each of 4 factors, 
yielding a 3 x 3 x 3 x 3= 81 population of factorial objects.21 We varied the 
gender of the perpetrator and victim where gender is assigned as “male-
perpetrator, female-victim,” “female-perpetrator, male-victim,” or “male-
perpetrator, male-victim.” The employee relationship of the perpetrator and 
victim within the workplace had three levels: a boss as perpetrator with a 
subordinate victim; coworkers; and the subordinate as perpetrator with a boss 
as the victim. The conduct involved either someone complimenting another’s 
outfit, rubbing a person’s shoulders in the office, or repeated sex joke emails. 
We also varied characteristics of the workplace environment, where the 
employing organization either had a strict, ambiguous, or no policy against 
sexual harassment. The vignette factors and their levels are displayed in 
Table 3. 
 
 19. See, e.g., Guillermina Jasso, Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and 
Judgments, 34 SOC. METHODS & RES. 334, 410 (2006). 
 20. For example, one vignette reads: “Cartwell & Downing is a magazine publishing house. 
The largest department within its company involves work on Indulgent, a cooking magazine. This 
department is comprised of 12 editors (9 male) and 27 support staff (22 female). Steve is Jane’s 
boss. One day, Steve said how attractive Jane looked in her outfit. Jane left the company because 
of what happened. There are no policies or procedures to address these matters.” 
 21. The three vignettes were not selected as a simple random sample from this population. 
Instead, we used a sampling technique to ensure respondents received all different conditions for 
the four factors. For example, for the conduct condition, with three possibilities (outfit 
compliment, shoulder rub, joke emails), all subjects randomly received each of these treatments. 
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TABLE 3. VIGNETTE FACTORS AND LEVELS  
Factor Levels 
Gender of Perpetrator-Victim (1) Male-Perpetrator, Female Victim 
(2) Male-Perpetrator, Male Victim 




(1) Boss as Perpetrator, Subordinate 
as Victim 
(2) Coworkers 
(3) Subordinate as Perpetrator, Boss 
as Victim 
 
Conduct (1) Perpetrator complimented the 
victim’s outfit. 
(2) Perpetrator rubbed victim’s 
shoulders in an office. 
(3) Perpetrator sent repeated sex joke 
emails to the victim. 
 
Workplace Policy on Harassment (1) There are no policies addressing 
these matters. 
(2) There are policies addressing these 
matters but are ambiguous. 
(3) There are strict policies addressing 
these matters. 
After reading each vignette, respondents answered a series of closed-ended 
questions about whether they think the target was discriminated against and 
how they recommend the target should respond to the dispute. These questions 
included whether the victim should find a lawyer (measured on a 1-7 scale), 
whether the outcome would be fair if a judge determined the dispute was 
harassment (measured on a 1-7 scale), and whether in the evaluators’ opinion 
the dispute constituted harassment (measured on a 1-7 scale). For this Article, 
we focused specifically on the question “given your understanding of law, was 
the employee sexually harassed?,” which was measured as a “Yes” or “No” 
answer. This variable allows us to compare how ordinary people and trial 
judges define the illegal sexual harassment. 
IV.  RESULTS 
We first examined our dependent variable to evaluate the general 
distribution of responses, not controlling for the variables featured in the 
vignettes or survey respondent characteristics. When we aggregated the 
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Given Your Understanding of Law, Was [the 
Victim] Sexually Harassed? 
responses to the three harassment scenarios, the dependent measure (given 
your understanding of law, was the employee sexually harassed?) had an 
unequal split where 40.59% of ordinary people and judges viewed the 
scenarios as sexual harassment, while 59.41% did not. However, when we did 
a cross-tabulation, analyzing whether there was a relationship between being 
an ordinary person or judge, the distributions changed dramatically. Figure 1 
below features a basic breakdown of the dependent variable by judge and 
ordinary people populations. Only 23.15% of judges evaluated the scenarios as 
harassment, and 76.85% of them did not. By contrast, 42.31% of the ordinary 
people viewed the disputes as sexual harassment, while 57.69%. This 
comparison reveals nearly a 19.16% difference between judges and ordinary 
people who viewed the scenarios as harassment. The relationship between the 
evaluation of these vignettes and whether a respondent was a trial judge or 
ordinary person is a statistically significant relationship.22 
















Next, we analyzed the relationship between the experimental conditions 
and whether someone is an ordinary person or judge influences the 
determination of illegal sexual harassment. Given the number of experimental 
conditions and corresponding levels, a graphical breakdown presented in 
Figure 1 provides a clearer picture on the differences across population. 
 
 22. This analysis was done using a chi-square test. X2(1) = 76.6563, p = 0.00. 
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FIGURE 2: BIVARIATE ANALYSES OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND 



















Figure 2 presents the bivariate analyses of the experimental conditions and 
the dependent variable, broken down by the ordinary people and judge 
populations. Overall, ordinary people are more likely than judges to evaluate 
the same scenario as constituting sexual harassment than are the judges, even 
when we take into account the experimental conditions. Figure 2 shows several 
key findings. 
We found significant differences on determinations of discrimination 
across ordinary people and judges depending on the gender of the harasser and 
the harassed. While ordinary people and judges view a scenario as sexual 
harassment more often if the perpetrator is a male and the victim is a female 
(45.31% vs. 39.13%, respectively), judges are generally unwilling to view 
males as victims of sexual harassment, as seen with only 37.5% of judges 
identifying a dispute as harassment if it involves a female perpetrator and a 
male victim, and 17.19% if the scenario involves a male perpetrator and a male 
victim.23 
The employment relationship between the perpetrator and victim yielded 
unexpected results. Ordinary people were most likely to view a scenario as 
harassment if the perpetrator was the victim’s supervisor (35.42%), whereas 
judges were most likely to view a scenario as harassment if it involved 
 
 23. The same-sex sexual harassment result is surprising because the Supreme Court 
explicitly stated this theory of sexual harassment is possible. See Oncale, supra note 13. 
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coworkers (45.31%).24 Ordinary people evaluated conduct evenly, that is they 
were equally likely to evaluate an outfit compliment, a shoulder rub, or joke 
emails in the same way. Judges, however, were overwhelmingly swayed by 
joke emails, describing a scenario as discrimination 65.52% of the time. 
Finally, judges were more influenced by the presence of a strict sexual policy 
than ordinary people. 
Finally, we ran a logistic regression to control for the experimental and the 
respondent demographic characteristics. Due to clustering of vignettes by 
respondent, we use clustered robust standard errors for our regression 
estimates.25 We ran three models. The first model included only the vignette 
experimental conditions and includes a variable to differentiate between judges 
and ordinary people. The second model included the vignette experimental 
conditions and the respondent characteristics, which includes gender and race. 
The final model includes the vignette experimental conditions, the respondent, 
characteristics, respondent ideology, and a scaled measure of legal confidence, 
using a set of questions that test civil litigation attitudes.26 We believe this 
third model would show whether there is a relationship between confidence in 
the legal system and evaluation of possible legal claims. 
A. A Basic Logistic Regression 
Table 4, below, presents the results of our first model. The models are 
broken down by judge and ordinary people populations, and the coefficients 
are expressed as odds ratios. With consistent bivariate analyses, ordinary 
people and judges are less likely to identify a scenario as sexual harassment if 
the victim is a male. The relationship is inverse. Judges view scenarios with 
same-sex male harassment have a 91% reduction in the odds of identifying a 
scenario as harassment, whereas ordinary people would have a 66% reduction 
in the odds of identifying a scenario as harassment. This inverse relationship is 
 
 24. Because these chi-square analyses do not control for the other variables, we believe this 
result is affected by other factors. We examine this result in a logistic regression model featured 
later in this Article. 
 25. Each unique human respondent in the ordinary people sample (N=1,883) and judge 
sample (N=199) responds to three vignettes describing possible sexual harassment, the total pool 
of observations is three times as large as the sample. 
 26. The questions emerge from prior research with each question presented as 1-5 scale, 
with 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree. See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, 
Perceptions of Civil Justice: The Litigation Crisis Attitudes of Civil Jurors, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & 
LAW 181 (1994). The statements used to construct the scale are: Most people who sue have 
legitimate grievances; There are far too many frivolous lawsuits today; People are too quick to 
sue rather than trying to solve disputes in some other way; The courts have made it easier to sue 
someone in recent years; Civil lawsuits have made this a more fair society; The number of 
lawsuits shows that our society is breaking down; Juries do a good job determining the outcomes 
of lawsuits and assessing damages; and The money awards that juries are awarding in civil cases 
are too large. 
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statistically significant for both populations. When the scenarios feature 
females as perpetrators, there is a 86% reduction in the odds that judges 
identify a scenario as sexual harassment, whereas 77% reduction in the odds 
that ordinary people identify a scenario as sexual harassment. This relationship 
was also statistically significant. 
We begin to see larger differences with the judge and ordinary people 
populations when we varied the status of the perpetrator. When the perpetrator 
was a coworker, judges were 4.7 times more likely to evaluate a scenario as 
sexual harassment than scenarios involving a superior as the perpetrator. 
Ordinary people, however, had a 20% reduction in the odds that they would 
view a scenario as sexual harassment if it involved coworkers than scenarios 
involving a perpetrator who was the boss. For the judge population, there was 
no difference with scenarios featuring a subordinate as the perpetrator versus 
scenarios involving a superior. By contrast, ordinary people still were less 
likely to view scenarios as sexual harassment if the scenario featured a 
subordinate as the perpetrator (14% reduction in the odds), but this condition 
was significantly different than scenarios featuring perpetrators who occupied 
a superior position within the workplace. 
This model reveals that the conduct in the scenarios greatly affected both 
judges and ordinary people. Judges were seven times more likely to evaluate a 
scenario as sexual harassment if it involved rubbing of shoulders and 34 times 
more likely to evaluate the scenario as harassment if the scenario featured sex 
joke emails versus a compliment to the outfit. Ordinary people also had similar 
evaluations of these conditions; although, to a lesser degree. They were 2.3 
times more likely to evaluate a scenario as sexual harassment if it involved 
rubbing of shoulders and 4.3 times more likely to evaluate the scenario as 
harassment if the scenario featured sex joke emails versus a compliment to the 
outfit. 
Finally, with respect to the presence or absence of sexual harassment 
policies, judges and ordinary people had similar results but varied when it 
came to ambiguously written sexual harassment policies. Judges were 2.8 
times more likely to view a scenario as harassment if it featured a strict policy 
against harassment and 4.31 times more likely to view a scenario as 
harassment if it featured an ambiguous policy versus having no policy. In other 
words, the odds of identifying a scenario as harassment were higher if the 
policy was ambiguously written. A strict policy increased the odds by 30% that 
ordinary people would view the scenario as sexual harassment. However, 
ordinary people viewed an ambiguous policy as no different as having no 
policy. Put another way, a strict policy mattered for ordinary people, whereas 
judges only required the presence of any policy (whether strict or ambiguously 
written). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT? 53 







Gender of Perpetrator/Victim 
MaleMale  0.09*** (0.04)  0.34*** (0.03) 
FemaleMale  0.14*** (0.07)  0.23*** (0.02) 
 
Status of Perpetrator  
  
Coworker  4.70*** (1.99)  0.80*** (0.05) 




Shoulder Rub  7.05*** (3.66)  2.30*** (0.01) 




 Strict Policies  2.80** (1.20)  1.30*** (0.07) 
 Ambiguous Policies  4.31*** (2.11)  1.06 (0.07) 
 
Constant   0.03*** (0.01)  0.80** (0.06) 
N 553 5599 
R-squared  0.2846 .041 
Reference categories: MaleFemale, Boss, Outfit Compliment, No Policies 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001 
 
B. The Empathy Model 
Table 5, below, presents the results of a logistic regression that features 
both the experimental conditions in the scenarios, as well as the gender and 
race of the respondent evaluating the scenarios. This model reflects our 
hypothesis that an individual’s background may influence how they evaluate 
the scenarios. Accordingly, this model predicts that women and minorities 
would be more likely to classify these scenarios as sexual harassment either 
because they themselves have been victims or empathize with the victims. 
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TABLE 5. LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND 







Gender of Perpetrator/Victim 
MaleMale  0.08*** (0.04)  0.34*** (0.03) 
FemaleMale  0.13*** (0.07)  0.24*** (0.02) 
 
Status of Perpetrator 
  
Coworker  4.80*** (2.10)  0.80*** (0.05) 




Shoulder Rub  6.90*** (3.60)  2.28*** (0.22) 




Strict Policies  2.90** (1.33)  1.30*** (0.09) 
Ambiguous Policies  4.43** (2.26)  1.06 (0.07) 
 
Respondent Characteristics 
Female  0.90* (0.33)  1.16** (0.06) 
Non-White   0.80** (0.34)  1.06 (0.07) 
 
Constant   0.03*** (0.02)  0.72*** (0.06) 
N 553 5599 
R-squared  .2855 .042 
Reference categories: MaleFemale, Boss, Outfit Compliment, No Policies, 
Male, White 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001 
As a general matter, the relationships with the experimental conditions did 
not change when we included identity characteristics of respondent. Female 
judges had a 10% reduction in the odds of identifying the scenarios as sexual 
harassment relative to their male counterparts, whereas ordinary people had a 
30% increase in the odds of identifying the scenarios as sexual harassment also 
relative to males. These results tell us females in the ordinary people 
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population would be more sympathetic to the victims in these scenarios than 
female judges. 
The results showed a respondent’s race mattered based on respondent 
population. We coded race in these models as white versus nonwhite given the 
small minority judge population and to make a consistent comparison across 
the two populations. Being a minority judge resulted in a 20% reduction in the 
odds a scenario would be viewed as sexual harassment than if evaluated by 
non-white judges. An ordinary person who identified as a minority did not 
evaluate these scenarios any different than a white respondent. 
These models tell us that while respondent identity made a difference, it 
did so in the opposite direction than what we intended. We suspect these 
unexpected differences were the result of a considerably small judge 
population with even smaller female and minority sub-populations. We also 
suspect there may be other variables that need to be controlled for such as age 
and political ideology. 
C. The Full Model 
Table 6, below, presents the results of a logistic regressions that features 
both the experimental conditions in the scenarios, as well as the gender, race, 
political ideology, and age of the respondent evaluating the scenarios. We also 
included a standardized index variable that measures confidence in the legal 
system. Like the previous models, the experimental conditions did not change 
dramatically when we controlled for additional respondent demographics; 
although, they changed in magnitude. 
TABLE 6. LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND 







Gender of Perpetrator/Victim 
MaleMale  0.05*** (0.03)  0.34*** (0.03) 
FemaleMale  0.04*** (0.03)  0.23*** (0.02) 
 
Status of Perpetrator  
  
Coworker  5.40*** (2.72)  0.80*** (0.05) 




Shoulder Rub  10.5*** (3.87) 2.25*** (0.22) 
Sex Joke Emails  53.1*** (5.79) 4.28*** (0.44) 
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Policies  
Strict Policies  3.50** (1.76)  1.29*** (0.09) 
Ambiguous Policies  9.01*** (2.26)  1.06 (0.07) 
 
Respondent Characteristics 
Female  1.40 (0.52)  1.13* (0.06) 
Non-White   1.51 (0.66)  0.97 (0.07) 
 
Political Ideology 
Conservative  1.32 (0.27)  0.92 (0.16) 
Liberal  0.56 (0.19)  1.08 (0.15) 
 
Age   
40s  0.00 (0.00)  0.73*** (0.06) 
50s  0.10* (0.11)  0.77** (0.06) 
60s  0.38 (0.36)  0.60** (0.05) 
70s  1.03 (1.06)  0.55*** (0.06) 
 
Legal Confidence Index  1.50** (0.32)  1.13*** (0.03) 
Constant   0.37** (0.21)  1.03 (0.11) 
N 527 5436 
R-squared  .3402 .0534 
Reference categories: MaleFemale, Boss, Outfit Compliment, No 
Policies, Male, White, Moderate, Less than 40 years old. 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001 
When we added the new variables into the model, respondent gender or 
race had minimal to no effect in comparison to the previous logistic regression 
models. A judge’s race or gender did not influence whether a person would 
perceive a scenario to be harassment. There was a gender effect in the model 
featuring ordinary people, which in this case shows there is a 13% greater 
likelihood a scenarios would be viewed as sexual harassment if the respondent 
is a female. Ordinary people who identified as minorities did not evaluate the 
scenarios differently than white respondents. 
Political ideology did influence judges or ordinary people, and their faith 
in the legal system did predict whether a respondent perceives these scenarios 
as sexual harassment. Judges and ordinary people who had high confidence in 
the legal system had an increased likelihood that they would view the scenarios 
as harassment. 
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Respondent age had no effect on the judge population but it did for 
ordinary people. In general, the older a person was, the less likely the 
respondent would evaluate these scenarios as sexual harassment. These results 
were not surprising because we expected to see oldest respondents as the least 
likely to view the scenarios as discrimination because they grew up and 
worked in environments before the enactment of sexual harassment laws. 
There were no age affects with judges, which we suspect is the result of a 
fairly homogenous population. 
D. Summary of Results 
This empirical project presents several interesting findings. Broadly, 
judges are less likely to classify the very same scenarios as sexual harassment 
than ordinary people. While this was not a formal hypothesis, these results 
make sense; judges are trained legal professionals who know the essential 
elements and the required evidence to prove these claims. However, we did not 
anticipate to see a nearly 20% difference between ordinary people and judges. 
Both ordinary people and judges deferred to a sociocultural model of 
sexual harassment where harassment constitutes the male perpetrator and 
female victim. In the bivariate analyses, it appears ordinary people were more 
willing to view males as victims, whereas judges were not. This was proven to 
be the case when we took into account other experimental conditions and 
respondent characteristics in logistic regression models. This finding supports 
our second hypothesis that gender hierarchy influences both populations. 
The perpetrator’s status in the workplace yielded interesting results that 
can be understood by the competing forms of sexual harassment. As mentioned 
earlier, there are two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment. Participants did not receive any information about the law. 
Given judges are familiar with the law, the fact they were more inclined to 
view scenarios involving coworkers as sexual harassment may hint that they 
were thinking about hostile work environment as the underlying potential legal 
claim. There was a slight difference with ordinary people in that they viewed 
scenarios as less likely to be sexual harassment once we controlled for the 
other experimental conditions and respondent characteristics. Common to both 
ordinary people and judges, a subordinate acting as a perpetrator was viewed 
no differently than perpetrators who occupy a superior role in the workplace. 
Once again, this result, while puzzling, may be explained by the ambiguity on 
what legal theory of sexual harassment was operating in this case. 
The conduct featured in the scenarios had the most influence in these 
models for both populations with judges being more influenced than ordinary 
people. Judges viewed conduct that involved a shoulder rub or repeated sex 
joke emails as harassment, whereas complimenting an outfit was not. In 
particular, the repeated emails experimental condition had the most impact in 
all the models featuring judges. Ordinary people tended to remain fairly 
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consistent across the conditions but the repeated sex joke email condition also 
proved to be the most impactful for them. This finding disproved our 
hypothesis that judges would be less affected by the conduct than ordinary 
people. However, this finding makes sense because judges are trained lawyers 
and are trained to seek out evidence to prove a claim. 
Ordinary people were more affected by the presence of a strict sexual 
harassment policy, whereas judges were influenced by the presence of any 
policy. Our logistic regression models demonstrate that ordinary people treated 
an ambiguous policy as the same as a company not having a sexual harassment 
policy, and that a strict policy increased the likelihood someone would view a 
scenario as sexual harassment. The presence of any policy (strict or 
ambiguously written) increased the likelihood a judge would consider a 
scenario as harassment. 
Finally, a person’s background had minimal impact on the determination 
of sexual harassment. Our logistic regression models demonstrate that females 
in the ordinary people sample were more likely to view the scenarios as 
harassment than males. This finding is consistent with social psychology 
theories of empathy where a member of the same group will identify with the 
person’s experience as discrimination. There was no relationship between a 
judge’s identity and the determination of sexual harassment. Both judges and 
ordinary people identified scenarios as harassment if they had high legal 
confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of our study reveal that there are three definitional approaches 
to sexual harassment. The first is the legal approach where the statutory 
language and precedent are the predominant framework when evaluating 
possible legal claims. The second approach is the classification of sexual 
harassment from social scientific perspective, whereby individuals apply a 
broader definition that may or may not include extra-legal variables. The third 
approach is the lived experience, or the empathetic approach, where a person’s 
background influences perceptions of harassment. 
While legal scholars and social scientists have long explored sexual 
harassment, few examined perceptions of sexual harassment and whether 
ordinary people and trial judges define it differently. We sought to fill this gap 
by isolating work and employee-specific facts in order to understand what 
influences a respondent to define a dispute as inappropriate versus illegal 
harassment. We also took into account an individual’s race and gender, 
recognizing that individuals who are members of a marginalized group are 
more likely to empathize with victims of discrimination. 
 
